We examine how land tenure arrangements affect Chinese crop farmers' adoption of straw retention, a key conservation practice promoted by the Chinese government in part to curb rising air pollution. Using data from a 2016 farmer household survey covering 1,659 crop plots in Henan Province in central China, we analyze whether farmers are less likely to adopt straw retention on rented plots compared to owncontracted plots. To address the potential endogeneity of the choice of renting from others, we use an instrument exploiting the role of remittance income from household members migrated to cities in a bivariate probit model and a control function approach, respectively. Our main results reveal that the Chinese crop farmers' likelihood of adopting straw retention were almost cut in half on rented plots compared to their owned plots, assuming the assumptions for biprobit or control functions hold. This suggests greater attention is needed to examine the spillovers across agricultural and environmental policies as China pushes for both a nationwide land rental market and more sustainable agricultural practices.
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Introduction

21
Land tenure security is crucial in promoting the adoption of various conservation practices, 
34
In China, land tenure security has particular relevance because, under the current Household 35 Responsibility System (HRS), agricultural land is owned by the collectives at the village level, 36 and each eligible farmer household is granted a land contract right to farm a village-allocated 37 land parcel with up to 30 years of tenure (Hu, 1997) . The distinct nature of rural tenure systems 38 confronts Chinese farmers with greater land tenure insecurity, which could potentially hinder 39 farmers' investments in production and conservation practices, especially those with a long time However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has explicitly modeled the role of land 55 tenure in the adoption of straw retention, an increasingly important component of conservation 56 practices (Pittelkow et al., 2015) . Straw retention (i.e., returning straw to the field) refers to a 57 residue management strategy of covering the crop straws on the soil surface after harvest, which 58 has been proven to improve long-term soil productivity (Lu, 2015; Wang et al., 2015) , and boost 59 1 Chinese farmers do not own the farmland. As will be discussed in detail later, the "ownership" of a plot by a farmer household in China is actually represented as the land contract right. 5 conservation practice compared to land formally allocated to them via long-term contracts from 78 the collectives. 79 To test our hypothesis, we use a 2016 rural household survey covering 1,659 crop plots in 80 Henan Province in central China and analyze whether farmers are less likely to adopt straw 81 retention on rented plots compared to own-contracted plots. To address the potential endogeneity 82 of the land tenure variable, we rely on an instrument that proxies the remittance income from the 83 household members who migrated into cities. Arguably, a higher ratio of migrants' income over 84 agricultural profits, conditional on available laborers and farmers' household income, would lead 85 to a smaller likelihood of renting from others but not directly shift conservation practice choices. 86 Following Wooldridge (2010), we employ both a bivariate probit and a control function approach 87 using the above instrument to address the endogenous explanatory variable of land tenure.
88
Our main results confirmed that Chinese crop farmers are less likely to adopt straw 89 retention on fields rented from others compared to own-contracted plots. In particular, the 90 bivariate probit and control functions controlling for the endogeneity of the land tenure variable 91 suggest that on average, the likelihood of Chinese crop farmers adopting straw retention on 92 rented fields are almost only half compared to that for their own-contracted fields. In contrast, However, the increase in duration of land contracts did not necessarily improve the tenure More recently, the Chinese government has formally announced the intent to protect and 150 split rural land rights into three parts: ownership, contract, and use. Ensuring permanent 151 9 collective land ownership, the government allows rural households to lease out the land use right 152 while maintaining the original land contract with the village government, which is largely to 153 stimulate land transfer through the rental market. 3 However, the decomposition of rural land 154 rights may raise a further question. The transferred land use right, which depends on how the 155 leasing contract is made between rural households, may not be as secure as the land contract 156 right.
157
While rural land transfer allows more flexible allocation of farmland across farmers, 158 potentially moving from inefficient producers to more efficient producers, it remains uncertain 159 how the tenants, who obtained the farmland via the rural land transfer market for a finite amount 160 of time, would treat these land parcels differently compared to those owned and operated by its land would have less incentive to make long-term investments, such as adopting conservation 164 practices (i.e., straw retention) on these parcels. In the first stage, after the crop is harvested for the current growing season, the farmer 170 household decides on the treatment of crop residues (straws), which involves a treatment cost 171 denoted by . In this context, we designate = for adopting straw retention and = for 172 non-adoption. Straw retention requires straws to be smashed before they are covered and mixed 173 with the soil surface, which takes additional machinery or labor costs and thus > 0. If straws 174 are not returned to the fields, farmers can either burn, discard, or use straws for other off-farm 175 purposes such as feed, fuel, and to sell. Any of these treatments may also involve some costs 176 including collecting, storing, and transporting of straws and thus > 0. It is difficult to 177 determine which of and is higher, as depends on specific straw treatment as well as 178 the crop type.
179
Straw treatment in the first stage will also affect farming for the next season. Let be the . Therefore, there are many ways that straw retention may 187 affect short-term profits, as a result it is common that < .
188
For the final stage, the farmer household is concerned with the terminal value of its 189 11 farmland, denoted by . Research has shown that straw retention can help reduce soil erosion 190 and improve fertility and productivity over time, thus better retaining the long-term value of the 191 land. Therefore, > .
192
Assume that a farmer household (either contractee or renter) selects a straw treatment 193 option, , to maximize the present value, , of the three terms previously discussed on a 194 cultivated plot (either own-contracted or rented), as shown by the following equation:
196 where represents the discount rate and the number of periods. Following Soule et al.
197
(2000), is included as a tenure-security indicator weighting the third term that measures the 198 farmer household's belief about its ability to use or sell the land in the future. Therefore, the 199 more secure the land tenure, the higher and greater importance of the long-term land value in 200 the household's decision-making process.
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Based on equation (1), it is optimal for a rational farmer household to adopt straw retention the potential short-term profit loss (i.e., the right-hand side) can be offset by the perceived gains 209 in long-term land value (i.e., the left-hand side). That is, with higher , or more secure land 210 tenure, the farmer household is more likely to undertake long-term improvement activities such 211 as straw retention, as stated in our hypothesis. concerned with short-term profits. However, could be higher than zero if renters can 219 continually use the land, which depends on the duration of the lease. In this case, more than 90 220 percent of the existing leases in the study region are oral and informal on a one-year basis. Thus, 221 we hypothesize that < or the probability of adopting straw retention is 222 higher for contractees than for renters, which we test in our empirical model. To test the above hypothesis, we first employ a binary discrete choice model derived from the 226 13 latent variable approach. Let denote a farmer household's decision to adopt straw retention or 227 not, which is generated from a latent variable, * , equal to ⁄ − from equation (3).
228
The difference between short-term profits and long-term land values for the farmer household is 229 unobserved, but one can observe the household's adoption decision. If * is positive, straw 230 retention is adopted and = 1 is observed; otherwise, = 0 is observed if * is negative.
231
For each household, , the latent variable * is assumed to be a linear function of the 232 vector of observable household, plot, and regional characteristics ( ) as follows:
where is the coefficient vector and a random error term. The linkage between * and 235 is as follows:
237 then the probability that household adopts straw retention ( = 1) is given by
where (•) is the cumulative distribution function of the error term . We assume that 243 follows the standard normal distribution and equation (6) is estimated by probit regression. , is assumed to be written as: 
287
In particular, we construct a ratio of annual income for a family's migrant workers to annual 288 agricultural profits for the farmer household as the instrument for the rental variable. The higher 289 the ratio, the higher the remittances the family receives from migration than from farming, and 290 thus a smaller likelihood that the household would rent more farmland from other contractees.
291
The idea is that the ratio serves as a proxy of a household's ability to earn additional income 292 from urban employment and thus is directly associated with household's rental decisions. It is 293 possible that the migrants' income ratio is still endogenous to adoption because higher 294 remittances means a lack of labor supply available for agricultural production, or more money to 295 potentially buy straw retention machinery. In other words, the ratio may affect the adoption 296 choice through laborer numbers or gross household income. Empirically, this can be overcome 297 by including these two variables as controls. 5 That way, the ratio variable is exogenous to 298 5 In our empirical models, as will be noted later, the number of laborers that engaged in farming activities and annual family income will be included as control variables in all regressions.
adoption conditional on available laborers and household income. and . Specifically, we can rewrite equation (8) as:
304
where ̃ is the fitted residuals from equation (9) 
where is the rental dummy; � denotes the estimated parameter vector for the probit 308 estimation of equation (9) The data used in this study is drawn from a rural household survey conducted by Henan
332
Agricultural University in 2016 in Henan Province, a major grain production province in central 333 7 In Rivers-Vuong's two-step approach, first run an OLS of the endogenous continuous variable, say 2 , on covariates z 2 and obtain the residuals �; then run the probit of the binary outcome variable, say 1 , on covariates z 1 , 2 and �. While in our model, the first-stage regression is probit and the second-stage is OLS but with generalized residuals.
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China. Henan is also a big crop straw producer, accompanied by severe air pollution resulting 334 from straw burning in open fields (Fu et al., 2017). 335 We have followed a stratified sampling approach in collecting our sample: for each of the 336 17 prefecture cities in Henan province, we randomly selected two to four counties, and within 337 each county, we randomly selected one or two villages among the agriculturally significant Province. 8
349
In our study area, many farmers grow at least two crops every year, typically corn during For each specified plot, the farmer is asked how he or she dealt with the straws after harvest 360 and asked to choose among the following options: straw retention, burn, use for fuel, use for 361 Henan 21 feed, sell, and discard. We assume that straw retention is adopted for a particular plot if straw 362 retention is chosen, no matter whether there are other selected options as well and regardless of 363 the specific share of straws being returned to the field (retention). 9 Of all observations, 9.3 As mentioned above, we form our instrument by constructing a ratio of annual income for 376 family's migrant workers to annual agricultural profits for the farmer household. 11 More 377 9 The survey does not collect information about the shares of straws for different straw treatments. 10 Due to widely used informal contracts between farmer households in most cases, it is not clear how the decision is made on a rented plot in this context. The decision-making process has been shown crucial in affecting adoption of conservation practices (Soule et al., 2000; Kurkalova et al., 2006) . For instance, in the United States, there are two types of land renter: share-renters' decisions may be affected by land owners because both the owners and renters share the revenues and costs of production; cash-renters, however, may behave more independently since they only pay a fixed rent to the landlords while the owners do not participate in any activities. Failure to consider the differences in decision-making process may obscure the effect of land tenure on adoption. 11 Besides migrant income and agricultural profits, the annual household income also includes income from off-farm business or employment, transfer income such as pensions and government subsidies, etc. Statistics from our survey reveals that migrants' specifically, the annual migrant income is calculated by the number of family migrant members 378 working outside the village, times the average working months, times the average monthly 379 wages. The annual agricultural profits are simply the profits of planting crops for the whole 380 family. All this information has been collected through the survey. insurance. We hypothesize that a richer, well-connected farmer household with better education, 391 more laborers, and insurance coverage is more likely to adopt straw retention. In addition, July 392 temperature and July precipitation are two weather variables included as controls of local climate 393 effect on farmer's adoption choice. Finally, at the plot level, we consider plot size, a season 394 dummy, and crop dummies to control for possible scale and seasonal effects, and heterogeneous 395 income and agricultural profits jointly account for about 75 percent of gross household income on average. 12 The household head's attitude towards risk is measured through response to a binary question "whether you will utilize a newly developed fertilizer that may increase yields but has not been used yet" and is assigned "risk-seeking" if answering "yes" and "risk averse" otherwise. impacts of crop types. We do not consider other topographic features, such as plot slope, because 396 most of our study area is flat and thus we do not expect significant within-province variation. 415 We first report the results of several simple probit regressions in which we test whether the 416 probability of adopting straw retention is higher in own-contracted plots than rented plots. That 417 is, we test the null hypothesis that = 0, where = − is the coefficient on 418 the tenure dummy and represents the difference of tenure-security indicator between 419 own-contracted and rented plots. Table 3 presents the resulting estimated average partial effects. 
Base probit regressions with an endogenous regressor
435
Column (1) in Table 3 
454
We also examine whether the estimated coefficients systematically differ by tenure type. We 455 conduct separate probit regressions for each of the two tenure categories, own-contracted and 456 rented plots, with all other independent variables the same as those in the full-sample regression.
457
A Chi-square statistic of 30.06 in the likelihood ratio test rejects the null hypothesis that the 458 coefficients are identical across tenure types, implying that the impact of all other characteristics 459 on adoption of straw retention relies on the specific tenure status of the plot. 13 The resulting 460 13 In conducting the likelihood ratio test, we do not specify clustered standard errors at any level in the regressions.
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coefficients and average partial effects by tenure type are reported in columns (2) and (3) in 461 Table 3 , which shows that despite similarity in other variables, the age of household head, 462 organization participation, purchase of insurance, plot size, and seasonal effect only matter for 463 own-contracted plots, while they have no effect on adoption for rented plots. The sharp disparity 464 reflects a significantly different decision mechanism for a renter in adopting straw retention.
465
Although the simple probit models shown in Table 3 provide suggestive evidence of the negative 466 impacts of land rental decisions on straw retention adoptions, it is important to note that the key 467 variable of interest, the land rental variable, is potentially endogenous and thus the estimates 468 might be biased. 469 470 To control for or mitigate the endogeneity of the rental variable, we also employ two alternative 471 approaches-a bivariate probit and a control function method with a linear probability model. In 
Results of bivariate probit model and control function method
481
As seen in the bivariate probit model, the rental dummy is still negatively significant at the 482 one percent level, but with a much higher average partial effect of 0.5113, meaning that being on Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the household level.
490
As for the control function method, the marginal effect of the rental dummy is -0.5251 and 491 significant at the ten percent level. It is noteworthy that the generalized residual term appears 492 insignificant at any significance level but with a very close p-value of 0.109, which fails to reject 493 the null hypothesis that renting is exogenous, suggesting that at least the endogeneity may not be 494 that apparent in our case. However, it is important to note that one could not fully rely on a 495 31 marginally insignificant test statistic to claim full exogeneity. 16 We argue that our control 496 function approach at least mitigated, if not fully addressed, the endogeneity concerns. We also 497 want to caution readers that alternative specifications of our control function approach, using 498 alternative set of instruments such as migrants' income in levels or without any instrumental 499 variables in the first stage, lead to statistically insignificant coefficient for the land tenure 500 variable. This suggests further research is needed to examine the robustness of these results but 501 even in these alternative specifications the coefficient for land tenure on straw retention is still 502 negative.
503
Contrary to the results in the adoption regression, characteristics of the household head, 
Discussion
514 16 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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Our empirical results provide evidence that land tenure insecurity, as proxied by rented plots, 515 tend to negatively impact farmers' decisions to adopt straw retention in China. Combining results 516 of all three regression models, we discover that after dealing with the potential endogeneity in the bivariate probit that measures correlation between adoption and renting equations.
527
Availability of machinery and agricultural subsidies from local government may be two 528 omitted factors and unfortunately they were not covered in our survey data. 17 20 To test the potential effects of contract type and lease term on adoption, we have also run several probit regressions for only the 155 renters in our sample. Results are reported in Table A .1 in Appendix 2, where we list four specifications with column (1) the base model and columns (2)-(4) with one or two of the contract variables augmented. However, results reveal that neither of the two contract variables is significant in any specification. Therefore, we are unable to identify the effect of contract type and renewal frequency in this study. within-village to cross-village or within-township, in order to allow farmer households to own 575 more contracted land and stimulate long-run land improvements.
576
The importance of our findings notwithstanding, they are limited by the fact that some of restricting the burning of straws and the forthcoming straw retention subsidy. It is possible that 584 the higher adoption rate is mainly due to the prohibition of straw burning.
585
Another caveat is that our empirical results may not always be robust in terms of the Note: ***, **, and * represent significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered at the household level. "Contract type" is a dummy equal to unity if the lease is written (oral otherwise). "Term of lease" is a variable indicating how many years the lease covers.
